



At the recently concluded May 4-6 summit
meeting in Tokyo, the u.s. and six other major
industrial powers agreed to work toward closer
coordination oftheir economic policies. Such
coordination is seen as a basis for moderating
exchange rate swings and maintaining a healthy
world economy. The focus on improving coordi-
nation stems from a heightened awareness by
policymakers that the attainment of national
interests depends on the actions of others, and
that flexible exchange rates do not fully elimi-
nate the effects of the policies offoreign coun-
tries on their own economies.
Many regard the agreement reached at Tokyo as
the natural result of international cooperation
over the past year to bring down both world-
wide interest rates and the value of the dollar.
This Letter examines the motivations behind
these policy actions and the prospects for con-
tinued international coordination.
Recent coordination efforts
The May summit agreement was only the most
recent of a series of joint steps undertaken by the
United States and other countries over the last
year. On September 22,1985, the G-5 countries
- the United States, West Germany, Japan,
France, and the United Kingdom - announced
concerted support for a reduction in the foreign
exchange value of the dollar. While the dollar
was already on a downward path, it continued
to fall following the agreement.
In January, the G-5 countries agreed on the
desirability of interest rate declines but stopped
short of coordinated steps to lower interest rates.
It was only in March that the United States, West
Germany, and Japan lowered their discount
rates - the rate that central banks charge on
loans to commercial banks - by half a percent-
age point. In April, another round of reductions
was undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the
Bank ofJapan. The Bundesbank, however, con-
spicuously chose not to make a similar reduc-
tion.
At the recent Maymeeting of G-7 countries, the
G-5 nations plus Canada and Italy agreed to
attempt coordination on a more formal ongoing
basis by periodically assessing one another's
policies and recommendingchanges to those
whose policies are deemed to be out of line and
damaging to others. To aid in these assessments
and the gauging of economic performance, the
countries will use an array of indicators that
would probably include output growth rates,
inflation rates, interest rates, trade balances, and
possibly, a range ofvalues for each country's
currency.
Rules versus discretion
Policy coordination among countries may take
different forms. At one extreme are agreements
by individual countries to adhere to particular
policy rules. For example, the Bretton Woods
international monetary system, in effect from
1944 to 1973, represented a rule-based agree-
ment whereby countries sought to fix the value
oftheir currencies in terms of the dollar. When a
currency departed from its fixed rate, the coun-
try behind it was expected automatically to
intervene to bring it into line. The European
Monetary System (EMS) is a more recent exam-
ple of coordination based on adherence to rules
of exchange rate management by cooperating
countries.
At the other extreme, coordination may take the
form of ad hoc arrangements reached through
formal or informal contacts to deal with parti-
cular economic circumstances. The joint effort
announced last September to push down the
value of the dollar and the recent discount rate
cuts may be seen as examples ofthis type of
coordination.
By their nature, rules limit policy discretion and
encourage individual countries to "bend" or
break the rules when they feel it is in their best
interests to do so. The collapse of the Bretton
Woods international monetary system in 1973
reflected the unwillingness of countries toFRBSF
accept the restraints on their national economic
policies required by the formal commitment to
maintain fixed exchange rates. For example, in
the period starting in the mid-1960s, when infla-
tion was putting downward pressure on the
dollar, the u.s. chose to let the dollar drop in
value rather than accept the economic stag-
nancy and greater unemployment that would
otherwise have resulted.
Short-term discretionary arrangements allow
more flexibility than long-term rules in dealing
with specific circumstances. Nevertheless, coun-
tries also find it difficult to achieve short-term
policy arrangements because the process of bar-
gaining and negotiating is time-consuming and
the circumstances underlying each round of
negotiations are changeable.
More importantly, the achievement of coordina-
tion agreements requires that the countries
involved be able toreconciletheirvarious in-
terests and views of the world. For example,
some may give higher priority to fighting infla-
tion while others favor lowering unemployment.
Even if policymakers could agree on goals, they
may differ with respect to views about the struc-
ture ofthe economy and the influence of policy
actions on targeted variables. For example, West
German policymakers are generally perceived to
believe that a given fiscal or monetary stimulus
will have a greater influence on the price level,
relative to output andemployment, than policy-
makers in the u.s.
In addition, coordination may be inhibited by
the unwillingness of individual countries to take
the necessary lead even when the same goals
are shared. For example, in a world recession,
countries may prefer to wait for the expansion-
ary policies of others to generate increased
demand for their products rather than stimulate
their own economies. Recovery therefore is
likely to be delayed or aborted, to the loss of all.
Reconciliation of interests
The success of either ruIe-based agreements or
shorHerm arrangements ultimately depends on
the ,continuing ability of the countries involved
to reconcile their interests and to recognize that
each has something to gain through interna~
tional coordination. The importanceofrecon-
ciling interests is apparent from a closer
examination ofthe episodes of international
coordination by the United States, Japan, and
W. Germany over the past year.
What motivated the U.S. last September to seek
a lower dollar was the desire to encourage
exports (by making them more competitive) and
discourage imports (by making them more
expensive), Both Japan and West Germany also
recognized the need to bring down the dollar to
head-off protectionist pressures in the u.s. The
dollar depreciation would reduce u.s. demand
for their products, but the economies of both
countries were showing signs of robust health at
the time. West German growth was picking up
strongly in the second and third quarters of 1985
following a downturn in the first quarter; Japan
experienced reasonable growth in the middle of
1985
Six months later, in March of this year, the u.s.
cut its discount rate because of a desire to stimu-
late an apparently sluggish economy (growth in
the fourth quarter of 1985 was 0.7 percent). In
addition, U.s. long-term interest rates fell over
1V2 percentage points between late-October
1985 and mid-March 1986 because of expecta-
tions of declining inflation and anticipated
reductions in the budget deficit. Since short-term
rates had remained relatively stable over the
same period, the cut in the discount rate
allowed the federal funds rate and other short-
term rates to fall in step. Still another rationale
was a desire to lower worldwide interest rates to
ease the debt burdens ofdeveloping countries.
The major reason both West Germany and Japan
followed suit appears to have been a concern
that the dollar was falling too rapidly. Matching.
discount rate cuts would reduce the likelihood
that the cut by theFed would drive the dollar
down faster. Japan was more than willing to
cooperate (and, in fact, had enacted a unilateral
discount rate cut in January) because the cut
would also stimulate its own then-slowing econ-
omy and temporarily halt the effects of a declin-
ing dollar on its exports. Because ofthe fall in
the price of oil and the growing strength ofthe
yen, the inflationary effects of such a stimulative
action were perceived to be small.West Germany's motivations were similar. Even
though the expansion of its exports was slowing
because ofthe strengthening ofthe deutsche-
mark, overall economic growth was moderate.
Domestic demand was being spurred by con-
sumer spending bolstered by income-tax cuts
that went into effect at the beginning of 1986.
Nevertheless, because unemployment remained
historically high at q. level of between 8 and 9
percent, West Germany viewed the stimulative
effects ofthe small discount rate cut as desir-
able.
Only the u.s. and Japan participated in the sec-
ond round of discount rate cuts in April, for
much the same reasons as they had in March.
West Germany refused to join in, citing the pos-
sible long-term inflationary effects of further
stimulatory actions despite inflation rates of less
than 2 percent in 1985 and 1 percent so far in
1986. Divergent domestic interests thus pre-
vented a complete agreement on policies.
The Tokyo agreement
The Tokyo agreement can be interpreted as an
attempt to create a relatively long-term arrange-
ment to coordinate international economic pol-
icies that also recognizes the general
unwillingness to return to a rule-based system
that rigidly limits policymaking discretion.
Before noting the achievements, it is worthwhile
to look first at what was not achieved at the
Tokyo summit. First, the countries did not agree
on a stronger form of coordination, such as
jointly set "target zones" beyond which cur-
rency values would not be allowed to fluctuate.
Most countries were unwilling to commit them-
selves to such a scheme because it would have
required them to take economic steps - such as
changing government spending and taxation
levels, reducing or raising interest rates, or liber-
alizing access to their markets - solely in
response to pressures on their currencies.
Second, the u.s. could not obtain agreement,
particularly from West Germany and Japan, on
an arrangement whereby countries automat-
ically would be obliged to adjust their policies
in response to "objective indicators" for measur-
ing economic performance. Such an arrange-
ment would have called for both West Germany
and Japan to stimulate their own economies fur-
ther by increasing their fiscal spending and, in
so doing, assume the "Iocomotive" role of sus-
taining growth in the world economy as u.s.
economic growth slowed.
Both West Germany and Japan have staunchly
opposed such policies. While West Germany
cut income taxes in January and has scheduled a
second set of cuts for 1988, one of its overriding
policy objectives remains to reduce the relative
size of its public sector. Because ofthe size of its
central governmentdeficit (near 5 percent of
GNP in 1985), the substantial increase in central
government debt over the past ten years, and a
prospective large increase in social security pay-
ments, Japan,also continues to emphasize reduc-
tions in the level of its central government
spending.
Instead of policy rules, the Tokyo agreement
calls for the recommendation, rather than the
requirement, of appropriate policies to countries
that diverge from desired international economic
goals. Individual goals are to be set each year at
ministerial meetings of the member nations, with
the International Monetary Fund to monitor how
well each country lives up to them. Proponents
ofthe plan hope that the pressure of interna-
tional attention will force individual countries to
comply with the jointly set goals. Nevertheless,
the ultimate success of the plan still depends on
a continuing coincidence of interests.
Certainly, the prospects for coordination have
been enhanced by the fact that all the major
economies are now growing. The sustained drop
in oil prices has improved the inflation outlook
both in the u.s. and abroad. In addition, the
anticipated decline in U.s. federal budget defi-
cits together with the recent discount rate cuts
represent a convergent trend among national
economic policies.
Given all these developments, the conditions
may be conducive to arrangements and conces-
sions that are to every country's best interests.
Thus, the Tokyo agreement should be seen as a
positive step by the large industrial countries to
reduce theinstability in world economies that
arises from conflicting national policies.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 202,276 190 10,197 5.3
Loans and Leases1 6 183,412 185 9,943 5.7
Commercial and Industrial 52,386 - 489 - 149 - 0.2
Real estate 66,968 244 3,881 6.1
Loans to Individuals 38,922 - 48 4,843 14.2
Leases 5,627 - 8 266 4.9
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,028 12 - 564 - 4.8
Other Securities2 7,836 - 7 817 11.6
Total Deposits 200,491 -1,318 7,644 3.9
Demand Deposits 48,297 ~1,646 4,464 10.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 33,792 - 650 - 6,269 -15.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 15,737 - 20 2,621 19.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,457 347 560 0.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,440 440 3,063 7.0
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 36,234 - 135 - 2,162 - 5.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,854 - 405 552 2.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change